Introduction
Regionalism emerged as a global policy concern during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, towards the end of the 1980s. Before then it had comfortably co-existed alongside the multilateral trading system. The stability of the system hinged strongly on the leadership that the US provided since the early days of the GATT until the late 1980s. It was only when the US turned to regionalism that the edifice of the multilateral system began to experience tremors, and regionalism started becoming a threat to the functioning and credibility of the multilateral trading system. The stumbling bloc/building bloc metaphor widely credited to the Columbia University scholar, Jagdish Bhagwati, reflected the anxiety that the rapid spread of regionalism caused.
In the Sutherland Commission report for the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the relationship between Regional Trade Agreements and the multilateral trading system is discussed extensively, although it has very little to say about those involving developing countries. The report is extremely cautionary about RTAs, suggesting that some of their agendas 'might lead the WTO to a wrong direction.'
1 It further argues that the administration of these schemes is complicated by their preferential rules of origin and with particularly onerous costs for small corporations and traders, and hence for developing countries.
2
Despite these misgivings, it is now widely accepted that RTAs are here to stay and will continue to exist alongside the multilateral trading system.
Of particular importance is how the two processes -regional and multilateralcoexist and in a manner that facilitates global trade liberalisation. In this respect "multilateralising regionalism" is proffered as a possible path by Baldwin in his recent paper on the subject 3 . But what are the prospects for and pitfalls of this path for developing countries?
The positioning of developing countries in the global economy has led them, generally, at a political level to resist the regulatory convergence imperative or "standards harmonization" agenda emanating from the industrialized world. Yet
African countries in particular, with the notable exception of South Africa, are largely takers rather than shapers of international economic institutions, including regulations. This is also the case with respect to their relationship to changes in the structures of global production and services which increasingly shape the agenda of regional trade integration. This resultant sense of vulnerability is playing out in the Doha round and in Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union (EU). From this standpoint it is difficult to see how African countries can constructively contribute to the "multilateralising regionalism" agenda. In fact the reverse is likely to be the case.
The paper begins with an assessment of the key ideas underlying the "multilateralizing regionalism" concept. The focus then moves to the enormous development challenges confronting African countries, rooted in chronic institutional weaknesses best considered a generalised crisis of the state. We show how these deeply entrenched challenges require Africa to engage more deeply with the developed world by adopting its standards as far as possible, in the hope of plugging their economies better into the globalization mainstream.
This points to the centrality of the north-south axis; but that runs counter to the political impulse to resist economic dependence on the developed world.
We also show how regional economic integration in Africa is often poorly conceived and in some regions suffers from chronic duplication, whilst the economic and political bases for it often woefully lacking. Furthermore, regional economic integration on the continent is often externally driven and characterised by donor-dependence. These channels of western influence are reproduced in EPA negotiations. Hence if, as seems likely, the European Union successfully links its aid to implementation of EU standards and insists on convergence to its regulatory standards it is likely that African countries would, as Baldwin's domino theory predicts, ultimately fall into line. 4 The key question then is whether an appropriate balance can be found between African countries' legitimate needs for policy space, the pressing need for them to upgrade their regulatory capacities, and the needs of the multilateral trading system. We conclude by illustrating these points via a brief case-study of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and its fraught EPA negotiations with the EU.
Reflections on 'Multilateralising Regionalism'
There are varied reasons why countries join RTAs. Some of these are political and relate to factors such as geographic proximity, cultural affinity, shared political objectives, economic ties, and shared historical bonds. Baldwin views this as "disabling" rather than "enabling" for developing countries as they miss out on deep tariff cuts and the allocative efficiencies that this could generate in their economies. Such efficiencies would be generated as importcompeting firms are rolled over by the withering force of external competition.
"Free riding" has been the hallmark of the participation of developing countries in the multilateral trading system until the Uruguay Round (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , and as a result their economies are still characterised by substantial protective barriers. This could also help to improve the investment climate and induce the activity of export interests who could be able to respond to new incentives and act as a voice for liberalisation. We explore this assertion with respect to the African case in the following section.
Political-Economy Realities of Sub-Saharan Africa
The This reflects both colonial histories and comparative advantages. Domestic markets remain small, dispersed, primarily subsistence-based, and this will likely change relatively slowly over time.
Whilst preferences in principle ensure market access for Sub-Saharan African products, frequently better than their developing country competitors, they are probably not sustainable in the long-term. In the specific case of trade with Europe, which accounts for the bulk of African exports (see Table 1 Sub-Saharan Africa, even concerning the so-called "big-states" 30 , but with the significant South African exception, is cursed with small markets. This renders domestic market diversification strategies, notably through import-substitution, difficult if not impossible -assuming it was desirable. Conventional wisdom, and much of "progressive civil society", avers that building regional markets through regional economic communities (RECs) offers a solution. Partly this seems to be rooted in the notion that regional economic integration will promote economies of scale amongst tiny markets and as such could be considered an extension of the infant industry argument. The notion of building institutional strength in negotiations with external actors is also important. And this resonates with deepseated notions of African solidarity, lending integration processes political support that is often not supported in substance.
More theoretically, proponents of the "New Economic Geography" advance strong arguments against promoting south-south economic integration schemes amongst poor developing countries.
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The theory predicts that whilst all countries in such schemes have a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing relative to the global economy, there will be one with less of a disadvantage than the others. In this sense, industrial activity will tend to relocate to the relatively advantaged country at the expense of the others. This effect will be aggravated by agglomeration economics, which promote industrial concentration in the relatively advantaged country (consider South Africa and Kenya in Southern and Eastern Africa respectively).
Furthermore, as tariff levels decline overall within the REC so those countries suffering from industrial relocation will also experience trade diversion effects - importing relatively expensive goods from the growing industrial centre rather than more efficient global producers, thereby lowering their overall welfare.
Meanwhile, the favoured country will gain as regional industry relocates to its soil and real wages rise as a result. Clearly these effects would generate substantial political tensions over time 32 which in turn would undermine integration processes. These are serious considerations.
Considerable benefits may be derived from economic integration in as far as it promotes the building or upgrading of trade-supporting infrastructure across the region. Thus, on the trade facilitation front, deepened regional integration is critical for a highly fragmented continent like Africa which has more landlocked countries than any other continent. This points to a more limited agenda, tailored to regional capacities. External actors have a critical role to play in supporting development of institutions such as customs authorities and infrastructure systems through an aid for trade agenda. These initiatives may have the added benefit of promoting regional value-chains and integrated production, thereby developing economies of scale to compete globally. The downside, however, will be the agglomeration forces noted above.
Yet the economic logic of north-south integration is much more compelling: it reinforces comparative advantages, promotes income convergence, and over time should also promote knowledge transfers from developed to developing countries. 33 Whilst it does not directly promote economic diversification in its own right, provided receipts from increased resource exports are appropriately reinvested -particularly in building Africa's productive capacities -in time this will support diversification. This is a strong theoretical argument in support of 32 This process was a substantial factor behind the unravelling of the original East African Community, as Kenya attracted manufacturing investment and relocation at the expense of Uganda and Tanzania. It also partly explains why South Africa continues to "compensate" its customs union partners for their membership of SACU. 33 The accession of relatively poor countries into the European Union in various waves provides strong evidence of such convergence effects.
EPAs, but more broadly integration into the global economy via the WTO plus unilateral measures. Unfortunately it is not a popular political position. administration, poor design of structural adjustment programmes, intolerant political cultures in recipient countries, and poor timing of the reforms, are some of the reasons cited for the lack of positive results. Issues related to geography (notably the landlocked nature of some of the countries) and institutions were not given proper attention during this phase of reform. Yet, along with political governance issues, these are important determinants of success.
Furthermore this attested to the importance of domestically driven reform processes rather than that imposed by external agents. It is also on the basis of domestic successes that regional integration schemes can sustain. In Oyejide's, view 'regional integration schemes should constitute an extension of the domestic reforms of member countries rather than act as a force to engineer them'. 36 This would require that countries have in place a strong governance culture and financial infrastructure that includes viable public service institutions, that there is macro-economic stability and that they develop the capacity for competitive domestic economy through the development of the private sector.
Concerning the politics of building African RECs, the most important issue to confront is that of deepening political commitment to regional economic integration. In light of the relative "youth" of states in the region it is perhaps not surprising to find that leaders in many countries are reluctant to yield their prerogatives. After all, regional integration involves pooling sovereignty -in Africa's case it is newly acquired. 37 Part of this political commitment should involve rationalizing the RECs given the well-known problem of overlapping memberships (see Table 2 ) and conflicting integration processes. 38 problems home-brewed in Africa, requiring Africans to resolve them.
Unfortunately the necessary leadership seems to be in short supply.
Confusingly, EPA negotiations configurations, at least in Southern and Eastern
Africa, are not coterminous with existing RECs (see Table 2 ). This places further stress on a delicate situation in which institutional capacities are already overstretched, and consequently threatens to divide the region even further. It also makes it difficult for constituent countries to agree on common negotiating positions, given that their tariff schedules and domestic regulations are generally not harmonized. 39 And it raises substantial legal uncertainties as the negotiating groupings do not have formal legal status, unlike the RECs that constitute them.
So it is not clear who exactly the EC will sign (an) agreement(s) with and how it/they would be administered. All of this highlights the fragile nature of African RECs.
Aggravating this situation is that European Development Funds (EDF 10 specifically) will apparently not be allocated to RECs in the next five year tranche (2008-2013) but rather to groupings negotiating EPAs. In the case of Southern and Eastern Africa, as Table 2 shows, this places considerable pressure on countries to consolidate their memberships if they are to access those regional resources; it also places pressure on the Secretariats to justify their existence given that it may not be they which will allocate funding. Whilst it is always a good thing for organizations to justify their existence, especially in a region as confused as Southern and Eastern Africa, this nonetheless raises questions about who exactly is driving the regional agenda. In this light there are persistent concerns that the EU, in promoting the regional economic integration agenda, has its own model in mind for Africa. 40 Whilst this may be a useful long-term aspiration, its current practical utility to a continent facing so many development challenges and a generalized crisis of the state is, at the very least, questionable.
As indigenous export interests are very weak they are not well-placed to respond to new supply incentives in international markets. Unsurprisingly, the majority of producers in the region are predominantly import-competing and may mobilise against outward-oriented regionalism which could expose them to the vagaries of international competition. The preoccupation is replacing imported inputs into the production of exports by domestic inputs. Hence, import-substitution industrialisation has a strong appeal and takes on a nuanced shape in intraregional trade agreements. While it may be possible to construct a region-wide import-substitution industrialisation as a short-term measure, as some regional integration schemes seek to do in Sub-Saharan Africa, these would remain inefficient and uncompetitive in international markets.
So it will be hard for Sub-Saharan Africa to evolve export trajectory on the back of import-substitution industrialisation in the mould of Asia in the 1960s due to lack of requisite infrastructure, skills, cost-effectiveness and productivity of factors of production. The continent is capital and skills deficient, which makes manufacturing difficult to take-off despite several attempts in the past to kick-start manufacturing via import-substitution industrialisation.
With no efficient producers in, for example components, and with levels of education and skilled labour force very low, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) likely to be attracted is either of the tariff-jumping type to take advantage of hightariffs, or resource-seeking, rather than market-seeking or efficiency-seeking.
Sub-Saharan Africa does not provide an attractive export-base for foreign capital, which inhibits development of indigenous capital that could benefit from supplychain linkages.
The combined effect of spaghetti bowl and production unbundling in propelling liberalization is thus unlikely to have resonance for Sub-Saharan Africa, except in the long run via intra-regional cross-border investment emanating from regional poles such as South Africa, Mauritius and Kenya, and stimulated by joint ventures and strategic alliances with private sector agents of these countries. Africa (COMESA -see Table 2 for an illustration of the extent of overlapping memberships).
SADC signed a protocol on trade in 1996, which came into force in September 2000. While this was a positive step towards greater integration in the Southern African region, it was motivated more by politics than by economic logic: the structure of the tariff-phase down arrangement is cumbersome, complicated by product-specific rules of origin and with a number of products coded as sensitive products. The complex rules of origin have served to constrain the trade liberalisation progress.
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The structure of production within SADC, like most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, reflects primary-sector dependence, with agriculture and mining constituting over 50 % of total GDP. The rest is made up of services. The exceptions to the norm are South Africa (resource-based and relatively diversified) and Mauritius (textiles, clothing and sugar) which have diversified economic structures. South Africa dominates the region economically as it accounts for 70 percent of its GDP and is by far the most structurally diversified economy.
Zimbabwe has a potentially diversified production structure, which is stunted by its political difficulties and declining confidence in its economy. This is an 
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Hence agglomeration is a real concern for those economies -the bulk of SADC's membership -that do not attract such FDI.
With respect to intra-regional cross-border investment, South Africa, Mauritius given the slow pace of tariff phase-down in the region it is unlikely that this target will be met. Indeed, many observers of SADC wonder whether this is a desirable goal in the first place, in addition to doubting whether SADC could actually achieve it. Nevertheless, SADC also seeks to complete negotiations for a monetary union by 2015.
It is doubtful that this linear model to integration which follows the EU template will serve the regional grouping best. There is widespread scepticism in member countries, especially within SACU, regarding SADC's ability to meet its targets for deeper integration. Most of these economies lack complementarities in trade as their production structures are similar and exports are destined for extra-regional markets, primarily the EU (see table 1 ).
Yet there is much more that the group can achieve beyond preoccupation with integration in a narrow sense. While, indeed, the group is making important progress elsewhere, for example, on issues of security and cross-border infrastructure development, there is little focus and impetus towards deepened intra-trade liberalisation within the group. This is in part explained by fears of South Africa's competitiveness and defensive concerns around protecting local ('infant') firms. . He draws a distinction between "conditionality" and a "factual" linkage between negotiated outcomes and development support, arguing that only once the package is in place can funds to support implementation be allocated. 57 Some also argue that if the EU's primary concern is African development, then it should not link regulatory reforms to market access for its companies. As discussed above we think market access is a mutually beneficial objective. seem imminent, whereas Tanzania logically should join its EAC partners in the ESA EPA group. That would leave SACU, and South Africa, to slug it out with the EU.
Concluding Remarks
Clearly the politics of negotiations do not lend themselves (currently) to an easy extension of the domino effect to Southern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. Similar dynamics are at play in the Doha round, where the Africa group has actively resisted the developed world's regulatory agenda, whilst pushing for Thus the politics of dependency rooted in colonial inheritances clashes with the need for African states to leverage their economic and political relations with the west, and Europe in particular, for their own development. In the end, whilst many African elites find the domino effect politically unpalatable they nonetheless are subject to its inexorable force. 58 Generating an accurate figure for the whole world's imports from the countries in Table 2 , in a way that is consistent across all of them (i.e. from the same reporting data source), is difficult. The following caveats must therefore be borne in mind when interpreting the figures. First, the aggregate figure for "world" imports from these countries is almost certainly lower than the real figure. Cross checking with alternative sources for South Africa's total exports to the world, for example, confirms this. The principle reason for this under-reporting is poorly recorded imports by many other developing countries, including those in Africa. Yet the data for these African countries' exports is no more reliable, but imports recorded by the EU, NAFTA, China, and Japan, are. As such, their shares in total world imports from these African countries are overstated, implying higher geographic concentration than is actually the case. However, this problem applies to all countries in the table, as the same source and methods were used for all of them. Thus the overall pattern or profile is broadly representative. 
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